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Newark, New Jersey 07102

<;CT~tJ

HALL L. IZEV.

9).\

( 111~)

Dear Mr. Hammer:
I am happy to enclose the first eighteen pages of my article
in order that you can start working on it. Fortunately, I have
been able to spend a few hours at my desk each day and I am
making good progress with the article. I have every expectation
that I will be able to meet the April 10th deadline.
If you have any questions or comments, please call my
secretary, Mrs. Shirley Hicks, at my chambers in Albany and she
will relay the message to me.

Sincerely,
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Encs.

Roger J. Miner
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Identifying, Protecting and Preserving Individual Rights:
Traditional Federal Court Functions
Roger J. Miner*
As an employer of recent law school graduates and a sometime teacher of law students, I have become a great admirer of
the teaching and scholarship of the law professoriate.

I have

only a few criticisms that are applicable generally to the
present-day work of those who have devoted their legal careers to
scholarship and education.

In an earlier article I noted that

"new lawyers are less equipped to handle the demands of modern
law practice than those of a previous generation" as a
consequence of "[t]he changing focus of academics, from doctrinal
scholarship to interdisciplinary studies." 1

Indeed, law school

curricula seem to be developing without much concern for realworld relevance.

I recently received a letter of recommendation

from a professor who urged me to hire a student of his as a law
clerk on the basis of the student's outstanding performance in a
course called "Bloodfeuds."

Although my court handles a rich

variety of cases, we never have had one that would fit within
that topical heading.

(Perhaps the professor thought that the

course would be of interest to me in connection with my relations
with my colleagues.)

In the same article, I placed at the door

of academia the responsibility for the failure of recent law
graduates "to obtain the oral and written skills of expression
necessary for the survival of the profession. 112
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Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals,
Circuit; Adjunct Professor, New York Law School.
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second

articles and other writings by academics themselves often are so
obscure as to be incomprehensible and therefore of little value
to the bench and bar.

When academics talk only to each other,

the rest of the profession suffers.
I have noticed that recent law school graduates increasingly
tend to discuss court decisions in terms of the perceived
predilections of judges rather than on the basis of legal
principles and legal doctrine.

This comes, as I understand it,

from the inclination of most law professors to classify judges,
particularly Supreme court Justices, as "liberal,"
"conservative," "moderate," "activist," etc., and to examine
their decisions on the basis of such classifications.

It seems

to me that this is an especially dangerous approach to legal
analysis since 1) it leads law students away from a proper
understanding of legal principles; 2) it impedes the development
of "think-like-a-lawyer" skills; and J) it is valueless for
predictive purposes, being based on the flawed premise that each
judge has an ascertainable agenda.

The professoriate would do

well to abandon this approach.
"Public Policy" is a response all too frequently given by
young lawyers when asked to articulate the principles upon which
a court decision is grounded.

While public policy concerns

should not be neglected in legal analysis, those who "profess"
the law have an obligation to make their students aware that
judges are guided by much more than public policy and that
precedent, legal reasoning, rules of statutory interpretation,
2

logic and stare decisis also are worthy of study.

Alison

Reppy, 3 who was Dean of my alma mater, New York Law School,
during my student days frequently repeated the following:
"Public policy is the wastebasket of legal thinking."
repeated that aphorism to a recent graduate of a

so~called

"national" law school, and she commented as follows:
strange?

I proudly

"Isn't that

We were taught that legal reasoning is the wastebasket

of public policy!"

It seems to me that the modern legal

education stew could do with a pinch less of "public policy"
salt.
Teachers of law hardly can be described as faddists.

Most

(especially those who are tenured) are free-spirited
individualists, always ready to abandon the beaten path, to shed
new light on old doctrine, to challenge conventional wisdom, to
reinterpret received knowledge, to revise history and to pour new
wine into old bottles (and drink it).

They revel in their

eccentricities, and this is all to the benefit of their students,
their colleagues and the legal profession at large.

And yet --

despite their independence -- law professors are all too
receptive to fads.

The current fad, universally accepted and

demonstrated in numerous scholarly writings, is the use of the
term "normative. 114

The use of that term by academics has become

so widespread as to be normative.
the word means.

I no longer know or care what

It has evolved into so imprecise a word as to

have no meaning at all for lawyers and judges.
I never see it again.
3

I do not care if

This year I have received approximately 250 applications for
the three clerkship positions available in my chambers.

Each is

accompanied by two or more letters of recommendation from law
professors.

A typical letter includes the following:

"Of the

three hundred students in my contracts class, Ms. Smith achieved
the third highest grade.

She participated in classroom

discussions, and I spoke to her after class on at least two
occasions.

From these contacts, I have formed the conclusion

that Ms. Smith would be the most outstanding law clerk ever to
serve in any court anywhere at any time.

If you desire further

information, do not hesitate to call me at the telephone number
listed below.

I am available in my office at the law school from

9:45 A.M. to 10:15 A.M. on the third Thursday of each month."

If

I never see another letter of this type, it would be too soon!
Finally, and to the point of this Article, it is generally
bruited about by the professoriate that the federal courts did
not become concerned with individual rights until the twentieth
century.

According to common academic wisdom: "[t]he concern of

the framers, especially the Federalists who fully supported the
venture, was principally with creating a central government that
would work and last, not with whether that government of limited
powers would engage in abuses of power. 115

From this viewpoint,

individual rights and the enforcement of those rights in the
federal courts were not on the minds of the Framers.

In the same

vein, one author has written as follows on the subject of "The
Supreme Court and Individual Rights":
4

The Supreme Court's role as guardian of
the rights and liberties of the individual is
a new one, a responsibility assumed in the
twentieth century.
For most of its history, the Court had
little to say about the Constitution's
guarantees of individual freedom.
Preoccupied with defining the relationship of
nation to state, state to state, and
government to business, the Court found
little occasion and less reason to deal with
individual rights.
Indeed, until the twentieth century
there was no broad constitutional basis for
the assertion of individual rights against
government action. 6
My purpose is to demonstrate that the original Constitution
was concerned with individual rights, that the Bill of Rights
gave even greater voice to that concern and that, from the
beginning, the federal courts were deeply involved in
(

\

identifying, protecting and preserving individual constitutional
rights.
In writing the original Constitution, the Framers were
indeed concerned with establishing a structure of government.
They certainly were occupied with questions of separation of
powers, of federalism, and of commerce.

But a close examination

of the document itself demonstrates that the rights of individual
citizens were very much on the minds of those who drafted the
Charter.

In the article dealing with legislative powers, the

Constitution provides:
The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it. 7
5

No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto
Law shall be passed. 8
The same article imposes restrictions upon the States in respect
of individual rights:
No state shall • • . pass any Bill of
Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts •
9

Article III, the Judiciary Article, which extends the
judicial power "to all cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority, 1110 refers
to individual rights in the following particulars:
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases
of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such
Trial shall be held in the State where the
said crimes shall have been committed • • •
11

No Person shall be convicted of Treason
unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to
the same overt Act, or on Confession in open
Court. 12
[N]o Attainder of Treason shall work
Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except
during the Life of the Person attainted. 13
Included in Article IV are two very significant provisions
protective of individual rights:
The citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in the several states. 14
The United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form
of Government • • . • 15
It seems clear that the Framers intended the federal
judiciary to enforce these rights.
6

In discussing the importance

of permanent tenure for judges, Hamilton wrote:
This independence of the judges is
equally requisite to guard the Constitution
and the rights of individuals from the
effects of those ill humors which the arts of
designing men, or the influence of particular
conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the
people themselves, and which, though they
speedily give place to better information,
and more deliberate reflection, have a
tendency, in the mean time, to occasion
dangerous innovations in the government, and
serious opfiressions of the minor party in the
community. 6

That inflexible and uniform adherence to
the rights of the Constitution. and of
individuals, which we perceive to be
indispensable in the courts of justice, can
certainly not be expected from judges who
hold their offices by a temporary
commission. 17
The provisions for individual rights and the constitutional
guarantee of judicial independence clearly are interrelated.
Judge Richard Posner, my colleague on the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, once stated the proposition most succinctly:
[I]t is hard to imagine why the framers of
the Constitution would have bothered to give
the federal judges such extraordinary
guarantees of independence if they had not
expected them to be aggressive in protecting
individual rights against encroachment by
other branches of government -- and plainly
they did; and though the framers' thinking
ran more to property rights than to what we
call civil liberties the constitutional text
is not so confined. 18
An excellent example of the role played by the federal

courts in the protection and enhancement of individual rights is
found in the enforcement of the constitutional provisions
7

prohibiting Congress or the state legislatures from passing bills
of attainder. 19

According to the records of the Constitutional

Convention, a unitary provision prohibiting ex post facto laws as
well as bills of attainder first was introduced and debated. 20
Interestingly, some delegates thought that a prohibition of

~

post facto laws would be superfluous and were reluctant to
support such a provision:
Mr. Govr. Morris thought the precaution
as to ex post facto laws unnecessary; but
essential as to bills of attainder.
Mr. Elseworth [sic.] contended that
there was no lawyer, no civilian who would
not say that ex post facto laws were void of
themselves. It cannot be necessary to
prohibit them.
Mr. Wilson was against inserting
anything in the Constitution as to ex post
facto laws. It will bring reflexions on the
Constitution -- and proclaim that we are
ignorant of the first principles of
Legislation, or are constituting a Government
which will be so. 21
The records of the Convention revealed that before any further
debate was had on the

~

post facto issue,

[t]he question [was] divided, (and] [t]he
first part of the motion relating to bills of
attainder was agreed to nem.
contradicente. 22
Although the ex post facto provision, an important protection of
individual rights, eventually was adopted, it is apparent that
the Framers perceived a greater danger from legislative
derelictions in regard to bills of attainder than from
legislative derelictions in regard to ex post facto laws.

An

examination of the history of bills of attainder makes it clear
8

why this was so.
A sentence of death under the common law of England was said
to fix a mark of infamy upon the person to be executed, who was
"then called attaint, attinctus (or] stained. 1123

The

consequences of this common law attainder were the forfeiture to
the crown of the personal and real property of the attainted
person and the "corruption of blood," which perforce forbade
inheritance from ancestors and transmission of wealth and titles
to heirs. 24

Bills of attainder, being legislative enactments

designed to inflict punishment without trial, are different from
the common law attainder that followed a sentence of death
following trial, and Blackstone recognized the significant
distinction between the two. 25
First enacted by the English Parliament around the year
1300, bills of attainder originally were designed to ensure that
dead traitors' estates would escheat to the crown. 26

They later

were used to punish those who engaged in a wide range of
activities that were considered inimical to the interests of the
cro'wn. 27

Bills of pains and penalties, also enacted by the

English Parliament, were different from bills of attainder only
in that they provided for punishments other than death. 28
Unhappily, these English practices were imported to colonial
America. 29

During the American Revolution, each of the thirteen

colonies enacted bills of attainder or bills of pains and
penalties directed at British loyalists. 30

Bills of attainder

found their way into the laws of the new states, and the New York
9

Constitution, adopted on April 20, 1777, was typical in that it
prohibited the state legislature from enacting bills of attainder
but provided an exception "for crimes . . . committed before the
termination of the present war. 1131

Approximately sixty pieces

of attainder legislation were enacted in New York between the
Declaration of Independence and the 1783 Treaty of Peace. 32
Among these was the Attainder Act of October 22, 1779, under
which fifty-nine New York citizens were subjected to the
forfeiture of their property as a consequence of being
attainted. 33

In Virginia, Thomas Jefferson himself, while

serving in the legislature of that state in 1778, participated in
the adoption of legislation to attaint one Josiah Phillips for
"hav[ing] levied war against the commonwealth. 1134
(

It is clear that the Framers recognized the evils inherent
in bills of attainder.

James Madison wrote that "[b]ills of

attainder • • • are contrary to the first principles of the
social compact and to every principle of sound legislation. 1135
Quoting Montesquieu, he noted the principal reason for
prohibiting bills of attainder:

"Again: 'Were the power of

judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the
subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge
would then be the legislator.' 1136

There was some ambivalence in

the courts about enforcing the Bill of Attainder Clauses in the
early years of the Republic, however, since the bills enacted at
the time of the Revolution were designed to attaint the hated
British loyalists and to confiscate their property.
10

For example,

in Cooper v. Telfair, 37 the court refused to declare that a 1782
act of the Georgia legislature attainting British loyalists was
void.

(It will be remembered that the Constitution prohibited

states as well as the federal government from enacting bills of
attainder.)

Each Justice who participated in the decision in

Cooper wrote a separate opinion, but the opinion of Justice
Samuel Chase expressed the common denominator:

"There is

. • a

material difference between laws passed by the individual states,
during the revolution, and laws passed subsequently to the
organization of the federal constitution.

Few of the

revolutionary acts would stand the rigorous tests now applied •
,.38

Clearly, the Court had a problem with bills of attainder

passed during the Revolutionary war.
The significant protections afforded by the Bill of
Attainder Clauses eventually found full expression in the cases
involving the so-called "test oath" statutes that were the
product of the Civil War.

On the same day in 1867, the Supreme

Court decided two cases involving test oaths that clarified bill
of attainder jurisprudence and, in doing so, struck an important
blow for individual rights.

In Cummings v. Missouri, 39 the

Court examined a provision of the Missouri state constitution
declaring it a criminal offense for a Catholic priest to engage
in his priestly duties without complying with the Missouri
constitutional requirement that he swear under oath that he did
not support the Confederacy.

Finding the state constitution in

conflict with the federal Constitution's Bill of Attainder
11

Clause, which had been read broadly to prohibit bills of pains
and penalties as well as bills of attainder, the supreme Court
noted that the intention of the clause was "that the rights of
the citizen should be secure against deprivation for past conduct
by legislative enactment, under any form, however disguised. 1140
And in Ex Parte Garland, 41 the Court found that an Act of
Congress prohibiting any person who would not swear that he had
not supported the Confederacy from holding public off ice or
practicing law contravened the Bill of Attainder Clause.

In both

cases, the Court performed a traditional federal court function
by giving life and meaning to a constitutional right.
Continuing to identify the Bill of Attainder Clause as an
important individual right worthy of protection and preservation,
(

the Supreme Court in 1946 invalidated a statute that foreclosed
the payment of salaries to three federal employees said to be
"subversive. 1142

The Court there noted that individuals need not

be targeted by name because the Constitution forbids any
legislation, "no matter what [its] form, that appl[ies] either to
named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group
in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial
trial. 1143

In 1965 the Court overturned legislation that barred

certain Communist Party members from labor union employment. 44
The Court once again warned against a cramped definition of
punishment for bill of attainder purposes and reiterated its
"emphatic[] reject[ion] [of] the argument that the constitutional
prohibition outlawed only a certain class of legislatively
12

imposed penal ties. 1145
Ultimately, the Court defined punishment for bill of
attainder purposes in terms of three tests to be applied to
challenged legislation, an affirmative answer to any one of the
tests being sufficient to meet the definition: "(1) whether the
challenged [act] falls within the historical meaning of
legislative punishment; (2) whether the [act] 'viewed in terms of
the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said
to further nonpunitive legislative purposes'; and (3) whether the
legislative record 'evinces a congressional intent to
punish.

11146

And so the courts, in the great common law

tradition, gave shape and substance to the stark verbiage of the
original constitutional provision prohibiting the passing of
(

bills of attainder by: expanding the Bill of Attainder Clauses to
include the prohibition of pains and penalties; extending
protections to members of named groups as well as named
individuals; and explicating the meaning of punishment for bill
of attainder purposes.

Beginning in the aftermath of the

American Revolution and continuing throughout American history up
to the present, bill of attainder jurisprudence has evolved as
the federal courts have performed their traditional functions in
relation to individual rights. 47

Each court decision in-this

area, including those discussed above, stands as a separate
argument to contradict the widely-held opinion that
[t]he seeming [sic] individual liberties
contained in the body of the Constitution • •
• were inserted into the federal Constitution
because they were necessary for a federal
13

structure, not as an assurance of rights
considered fundamental or crucial to human
happiness or fulfillment. 48
The story of the adoption of the Bill of Rights need not be
repeated at length here.

Suffice it to say that Madison,

although originally opposed to a so-called declaration of rights,
eventually came around to favor it and in fact became its
author. 49

The Federalists, supporters of the Constitution in

its original form, thought that a national bill of rights was
unnecessary because 1) the Constitution created a limited
government and was not a threat to individual rights; 2) an
attempt to specify rights could be harmful because certain
important rights that were not listed might be considered
unprotected: 3) a national bill of rights might reflect the
"lowest common denominator" of the rights considered important by
the individual states; and 4) a bill of rights might imply
certain powers in the federal government that were not
intended. 50

Added to this, of course, would be the argument

that the rights considered most fundamental already were included
in the origina,1 Constitution.

The Anti-Federalists, on the other

hand, saw the omission of a bill of rights as a basis for
defeating the Constitution and urged the citizenry to demand
additional constitutional provisions for individual rights. 51
The ratification conventions of the states urged adoption of
certain individual rights amendments, and the First Congress
submitted twelve amendments to the states for ratification in
1789.

Ten of the amendments were ratified by the states by 1791
14

and became the Bill of Rights. 52

What does need repeating here,

in support of the theme of this Article, is the following
statement made on June 8, 1789 by James Madison during the debate
in the House of Representatives on the Bill of Rights amendments:
If they are incorporated into the
constitution, independent tribunals of
justice will consider themselves in a
peculiar manner the guardians of those
rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark
against every assumption of power in the
legislative or executive; they will be
naturally led to resist every encroachment
upon rights expressly stipulated for in the
constitution by the declaration of rights. 53
This statement may have had its genesis in a letter dated March
15, 1789 sent by Thomas Jefferson to Madison from Paris
expressing support for the proposed declaration of rights:
In the arguments in favor of a declaration of
rights, you omit one which has great weight
with me, the legal check which it puts into
the hands of the judiciary. This is a body,
which if rendered independent, and kept
strictly to their own department merits great
confidence for their learning and
integrity. 54
Both Jefferson and Madison correctly foresaw that the individual
rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights would find their primary
source of protection in the federal courts.
Besides adopting the constitutional amendments known as the
Bill of Rights, the First Congress adopted an enduring piece of
legislation officially titled: "An Act to Establish the Judicial
courts of the United States. 1155

This legislation frequently has

been referred to as the Judiciary Act of 1789 or the First
Judiciary Act, and it established a three-level system of
15

national courts that has continued, with various changes related
to the jurisdiction and functions of the courts, to the present
day. 56

There can be little doubt of the interrelationship

between the Bill of Rights and the First Judiciary Act.

Both

were adopted with an eye to Anti-Federalist objections to the
lack of specificity in the judiciary article of the Constitution
as well as to the omission of a declaration of rights in the
original Charter. 57

Accordingly, a number of rights in the Bill

of Rights had to do with the judiciary: the requirement of a
grand jury indictment; 58 the prohibitions against double
jeopardy and self-incrimination;59 the requirement of due
process;~

in criminal cases, the rights to a speedy and public

trial by jury in the vicinage of the crime, 61 compulsory process
to obtain favorable

witnesses,~

and assistance of

counsel;~

the right to trial by jury in suits at common law and a
restriction on the reexamination of facts so tried;M and the
prohibitions against excessive bail and cruel and inhuman
punishment.~

The complementary jurisdiction conferred upon

each of the three tiers of the new federal judicial system in
civil and criminal cases by the Judiciary Act of 1789 clearly
evinced the intent of the First Congress to establish
"independent tribunals of justice" as "guardians of [the bill of]
rights. 1166
It was not until 1833, in a case titled "Barron v. The Mayor
and city Counsel of Baltimore 1167 that the Supreme Court decided
that the Bill of Rights applied only to the national government
16

and did not restrict state authority.

The holding arose in the

context of a claim by the plaintiff that the City of Baltimore
had rendered his wharf useless by causing the deposit of large
amounts of sand and earth to be made near the wharf.

The water

adjacent to the wharf thereby became too shallow for the berthing
of most vessels and Barron sought recovery on the claim of
deprivation of property without due process, in violation of the
Fifth Amendment.

Chief Justice Marshall saw the issue as one "of

great importance, but not of much difficulty, 1168 and sent the
matter off by reasoning that the amendments were not explicitly
made applicable to the states:
[If] the framers of these amendments intended
them to be limitations on the powers of the
State governments they would have imitated
the framers of the original Constitution, and
have expressed that intention. Had Congress
engaged in the extraordinary occupation of
improving the constitutions of the several
States by affording the people additional
protection from the exercise of power by
their own governments in matters which
concerned themselves alone, they would have
declared this purpose in plain and
intelligible language. 69
There are those who question whether the issue was as
lacking in difficulty as the Court perceived it to be.
Gerald Gunther, for example,
[n)ote[s) that a different inference might be
drawn from the text of the Bill of Rights:
the First Amendment explicitly inhibits
"Congress" (but has been read to apply to the
entire national government); the Seventh
Amendment is explicitly addressed to "any
Court of the United States"; but all of the
other Bill of Rights provisions speak in
general terms. And a few courts, before
Barron, thought those provisions generally
17
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applicable.ro
As will be seen, it was not until the courts seized upon the
Fourteenth Amendment that the Bill of Rights would be considered
to protect against state action.

Until then, however, the courts

would continue to identify, protect and preserve individual
rights against adverse action by the federal government as
specifically provided in the original Constitution as well as in
the Bill of Rights.
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